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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
party, by service of notice,71 may take the deposition of an adverse party
without a showing of special circumstances. 2 CPLR 3101, unlike CPA
288, however, does not expressly permit a party to perpetuate his own
testimony by self-deposition. Case law has construed the statute as per-
mitting this practice without a showing of special circumstances. 73
Boyo v. New York City Transit Authority74 reaffirms the validity of
this practice.
In Boyo, the defendant opposed the plaintiff's motion to per-
petuate her testimony pursuant to CPLR 3101 on the ground that the
plaintiff, a 75-year-old woman, failed to submit a medical affidavit
proving that illness, likelihood of death, or other special circumstances
mandated the deposition. The Supreme Court, Kings County, held that
the plaintiff was entitled to perpetuate her testimony solely on the
basis of her advanced age,7 5 relying on the legislative intent expressed
in CPLR 3403, which provides for a trial preference as a matter of right
"in any action upon the application of a party who has reached the
age of seventy-five years."
Such a motion should be granted regardless of the absence of
special circumstances.7 6 Clearly, the intent of the CPLR is to liberalize
disclosure. Moreover, CPLR 311 7,77 by restricting the use of depositions
at trial, discourages needless self-depositions. Where this practice would
be burdensome to the adverse party, he may seek a protective order
under CPLR 3103.
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Fourth Department allows disclosure against non-
party witness where it will aid preparation for trial.
CPLR 3101(a)(4) provides that a nonparty witness may be required
to disclose information material and necessary to a party's claim or
defense provided that there exist adequate special circumstances. When
the nonparty witness might have been unavailable for trial, or was
71 CPLR 3107.
72 In re Estate of Keljikian, 44 Misc. 2d 176, 253 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sur. Ct. Westchester
County 1964).
78 Lapensky v. Gordon, 41 Misc. 2d 958, 246 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964),
discussed in The Biannual Survey, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 433 (1964) (72-year-old plain-
tiff permitted to take her own deposition without a showing of special circumstances). See
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary at 18, 22 (1970); 7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d, § 42:79, at
132 (1966); 3 WK&M 3101.22. Cf. Shaw v. Hospital Ass'n, 57 Misc. 2d 461, 292 N.Y.S.2d
984 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1968).
74 72 Misc. 2d 165, 339 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
75 Id. at 166, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
76 See note 73 supra. Cf. CPLR 104, 3101(a)(1).
77 CPLR 3117 requires that a party seeking to introduce a deposition at trial show
that the witness is either: (1) dead; (2) more than 100 miles from the courtroom; (3) un-
available because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; (4) unavailable despite
diligent efforts to procure his attendance; or that exceptional circumstances exist.
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hostile, or had special or exclusive knowledge of the facts, the special
circumstances rule has been held satisfied and disclosure permitted.7 8
Courts have been reluctant, however, to allow pretrial examinations in
other than these well-settled cases, for example, if the examination
would only assist the moving party in his trial preparation. 9
In Kenford Co. v. County of Erie,80 a contract action, the defen-
dants intended to interpose the affirmative defenses of fraud and mis-
representation, and in order to aid their preparation, moved to examine
three nonparty witnesses without showing any of the traditional special
circumstances. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, modified
the trial court's order allowing the examination of two of the nonparty
witnesses, unanimously holding that the mere involvement of one of
them in transactions which led to the formation of the subject contract
constituted sufficient special circumstances to justify his examination.8'
The other nonparty witness was excused since the defendants sought to
interrogate him only with respect to his activities after the execution
of the contract. s2
Kenford, in effectively assimilating the special circumstances
requirement as to nonparty witnesses within the general rule calling
for "full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecu-
tion or defense of an action . . . " is a laudable step toward removing
the last remnants of distinction between parties and nonparties at the
pretrial disclosure stage.
CPLR 3101(d): Names of eyewitnesses, even if obtained by investiga-
tion, are discoverable if they are material and necessary.
Generally, under the CPA, a party was not entitled to disclosure
of the names of witnesses which the other party intended to use at
78 See, e.g., Brooklyn Express Co. v. Key Food Stores Cooperative, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d
608, 335 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.); General Bldg. Supply Corp. v. State, 63
Misc. 2d 520, 312 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Ct. Cl. 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 500, 520 (1971); Williams v. Sterling Estates, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 692, 245
N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963); 7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d §§ 42:83-85 (1966); 3
WK&M 3101.31; cf. Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 2 App. Div. 2d 430, 156
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1956).
79 See Pearson v. Pouthier, 33 App. Div. 2d 531, 314 N.Y.S.2d 302 (4th Dep't 1969)
(mem.); McDonald v. Gore Mt. Ski Lift Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 931, 293 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d
Dep't 1968) (mem.); 3 WK&M 3101.33.
8041 App. Div. 2d 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300 (4th Dep't 1973) (mere.).
81id. at 587, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 302, citing 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3101, commentary at
25-27 (1970). In his commentary, Professor Siegel states:
If a witness holds the key, or merely a key, to any substantial fact involved in the
case, how can any lawyer in this day and age be compelled to go to trial without
knowing intimately what that witness is going to say?
Id. at 27.
8241 App. Div. at 587, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
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